Throughout America, constitutions in force today often recognize the presence and certain rights of indigenous peoples, indigenous peoples taken in the sense uttered by an international treaty such as the 1989 International Labour Organisation Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: »Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions«. So far, States in America have mostly ratified this multilateral treaty.
1
Specific constitutional sections in America deal with indigenous rights. However, constitutions are not usually further amended or reviewed on the latter's behalf. Therefore, I aim to tackle the unreformed part -the larger and essential share. I shall question whether history can help with the reading, understanding, and construction of the whole of current constitutions, not just specific sections, as regards indigenous rights -the rights of peoples who as polities may pre-exist the very States. In brief, what is the use of legal history for constitutional indigenous understanding? It is an unusual query in both research and teaching at Latin and Anglo American law schools by either constitutionalists or historians.
For brevity's sake, we need just one sample. Let it be Panama. I have chosen some constitutional statements among those that make no direct reference to indigenous people. The issue may be twofold: freedom of religion and archaeological sites. The Panamanian Constitution recognizes the former and nationalizes the latter.
2 On the one hand it grants religious freedom and on the other it takes archaeological sites into the public sector as matters of fact and law not concerning indigenous people. What have these statements to do with them? At first glance, nothing at all, or maybe something, as long as it might be assumed first that every Panamanian citizen, indigenous or non-indigenous, is entitled to freedom of religion and secondly that all this citizenship benefits from the care and management of the archaeological heritage by the Republic of Panama, their State. Should we take both readings for granted? Let us check texts. Let us excavate in a constitutional site. Let us go at once constitutionalist and archaeologist. Let us be historians.
When Panama became independent from Colombia at the beginning of the 20th century under the impulse and protection of the United States, religious freedom was granted, but its first Constitution excluded non-Christianised indigenous people from enjoyment of the same by funding and empowering Catholic missions to convert them. The same clause stated both freedom on behalf of non-indigenous people and the obligation for indigenous people to withdraw their own beliefs and practices. So it was for the Panamanian constitutionalism from 1904 to 1972.
3 Implicitly, a kind of rationale operated. For the non-indigenous constitutional party, Christian religions were thought to be civilisation and non-Christian religion barbarism or no religion at all. Since 1972, has the constitutional silence on such discrimination terminated indigenous exclusion? You can never be sure. Today, the Panama Constitution recognizes the different »cultural patterns« of indigenous peoples, yet it refers to the need for »cul-tural change through scientific methods«, thus substituting the missionary way.
4 No comment. History is revealing. You need its help to read between the constitutional lines. You may also notice the continuous phrasing on Christian framework encroaching on freedom up to the present.
5
On the other hand, when archaeological sites were nationalized by the 1941 Panama Constitution, the normative language also made some reference to indigenous people: »The indigenous guacas belong to the Republic of Panama«.
6 Guaca, also spelled huaca, is a clue. It is a word used in America, mainly throughout the Andes, by Spanish speakers, but it does not belong to the tongue handed down by Spain. It is Quechua or Runasimi, coming to Panama through Colombia. Among American Spanish speaking people, guaca really means ancient ruins and remains or also hidden treasures and even personal savings or dirty money kept out of the reach of government and banks. In Quechua, it holds a prior meaning, naming places and structures where distinguished ancestors are buried, venerated artefacts are saved, congregational meetings are hold, cultural identities are performed, or relief from suffering and resort for rest are furnished. Guacas are sacred indigenous sites, Quechua or not (there are no Quechua people in Panama). They continue to be so even when assaulted and ruined by alien people. If you cannot move to the Andes and gain the confidence of some individuals among the over ten million Quechua-speaking people in order to become duly informed, there are publications and addresses to be profitably visited, although they would by no means substitute local knowledge. History always helps.
7
When the Republic of Panama Constitution nationalized guacas, indigenous peoples were expropriated or rather colonial prior expropriation under Spanish rule was thus finally constitutionalized. Yet, only the right of private proprietors -non-indigenous landowners -was taken into consideration in order to be duly compensated, just as if indigenous peoples did not exist or, at least, were not entitled to rights.
8
Rather the latter was the case. Remember the terms of the constitutional recognition of religious freedom. As long as they remained nonChristian, by frequenting their sacred places for instance, indigenous people were not entitled to liberty. They had to be under the control of Catholic missions backed and funded by the constitutional Republic. Thus, for constitutions, guacas could not be religious sites, but only archaeological remains. They could not be indigenous possessions or even heritage. Actually, for constitutions, for their set of freedoms, regarding conscience, ownership and maybe so all the rest, indigenous peoples did not exist. Needless to say that Catholic and other Christian churches and sacred places were not expropriated.
Are we facing constitutional contradictions or rather some kind of constituent rationale, so to speak? So far, we know that the latter may be the case. History opens your eyes. Some logic lay in the double standard concerning religious freedom and access to shrines. The rationale may now be overlapped but it was quite diaphanous in past constitutional language. Religion did not mean any religion. People who made constitutions in America bore in mind on the one hand religion entitled to freedom and on the other superstition needing conversion, this is the EuroAmerican civilization to be expanded and the Indo-American barbarism to be eradicated, culture and its lack all in the singular. The entire set of constitutional freedoms might be regarded in the light of this discrimination between nonindigenous and indigenous peoples, against the latter, on cultural tenets prior to legal terms. Hence, the constitutional wording may not encompass indigenous religions.
9
The incumbent question is whether the discriminatory construct trembles and falls once the language recedes and shifts. The Constitution of Panama currently registers freedom of conscience on the one hand and nationalization of archaeological sites on the other without any indigenous reference for any of these items. Does it make a difference? Is it the end of this story? Did the dichotomy vanish when the double standard disappeared from the constitutional phrasing? Have constitutions therefore become straightforward? Is the problem over? It does not seem so. We must yet learn from history. Present reading does not grasp actual meaning. Aside from other lightness and sightlessness, the history-blind Constitution does not manifest the import of its standing deficit of freedoms.
10
In the current constitutional text of Panama, nothing is said about either the indigenous exclusion from religious freedom or their deprivation of sacred guacas, yet the signs are still there. The State is the owner and manager of the socalled archaeological sites. Christendom places limits to freedom. Past layers may be alive in present text as a pervading shadow constitution. Derogatory references are cancelled, but not counteracted. We should not take constitutional statements at their face value. Eventual recognition of indigenous cultures and rights, so usual nowadays throughout America, comes as a kind of interpolation to constitutions not amended in their entirety on the behalf of this not so new human presence. Even so, with its novelty and all, 11 the Panamanian Constitution provides for policy to achieve the »cultural change« of indigenous communities »through scientific methods«, as we know. Sciences such as anthropology and politics receive the baton from religious missions in the relay race to convert indigenous people. Might instead history counteract the constitution? Yet, is there such a divide between history and law?
Let us take into account a third constitutional pronouncement not directly referring to indigenous people. I mean the generic provision on territorial structure of the Republic of Panama allowing »special regimes« or, in past constitutions since 1941, »special territories« as exempted from the common division into provinces and districts. No much wonder that it is a formula for accepting, on sufferance, the indigenous resistance to the political presence and organisation of the Republic of Panama. The Constitution says that »the special regime may be created by statute« -by Panamanian legislation -but peoples are the producers of that very speciality through their opposition to the State. »Special territories« turn out to be indigenous territories. Constitutional creation is mere pretension.
It is the visible tip of a submerged iceberg. Today, within the State frontiers, there are indigenous polities even supporting their »special regime« in international standards regarding peoples' rights rather than Panamanian laws branded by them as still colonialist. As the 1989 International Labour Organisation Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples calls to mind, these peoples are older than the State itself. They descend »from the populations which inhabited the country (…) at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries«.
The Embera-Wounaan is one of these peoples. Their Carta Orgánica, the organic charter enacted by the Embera-Wounaan Congress in 1993, though dependent upon Panamanian legislation, reads thus in its preamble: »During the last 500 years non-indigenous people have set the law for indigenous people, implying the systematic violation of the indigenous peoples' rights (…). The law in force in Panama keeps this derogatory and undemocratic nature, so a dramatic turn of the legal approach to the standing of indigenous peoples is badly needed in order to actually favour the entitlement, exercise and enjoyment of their fundamental rights. Thus, in the present realm of international law with both the Organization of the American States and the United Nations Organization, declarations and conventions for the warrant of the Human Rights of the Indigenous Peoples and their legal and political systems are in progress«.
13 Thus we meet a side of history not usually taken into account at law schools even throughout America, though it ought to be of deep concern to constitutionalism itself. It is the dark side of that same constitutional history.
There may be both constitutional history and law outside and at the expense of the very constitutions. There are constitutional rights through counter-constitutional history, so to say. The signs are etched in the same constitutional documents, but you are in need of history, both indigenous and non-indigenous, to read them. In fact, since independence took place under the direct influence of the United States on behalf of the inter-hemispherical canal, Panama has tried to follow the example displacing and confining indigenous peoples into reservations. The ward did it less successfully than the sponsor. Colombia, from which Panama seceded, had made the first constitutional move in 1811 putting indigenous areas on the same level with inhabited lands, as terrae nullius according to the contemporaneous law of nations, 14 as if these peoples were not there or ought not to exist anywhere, later adopting the United States formula of territories under especial rule. Thus, Panama inherited the know-how from both its sponsor or rather godfather and its mother country, Colombia. As for the same constitutional device, Spain was only one of the grandmothers, the other one being the Catholic Church.
15
In the case of Colombia, including Panama, as regards indigenous peoples, the constitutional starting off was much more complex. The 1811 Colombian Constitution, then called of Nueva Granada (Columbus' name would come later), began by considering indigenous territories nullius, yet it added that the »wandering tribes or nations of uncivilised Indians« were supposed to be treated on friendly terms according to »Chris-tian love«. Thus, »treaties and settlements« might be agreed with them in order »to protect their rights through the humanity and philanthropy required from us given their present state of imbecility«.
16 Treaties existed so far. Before Latin American independence, the Spanish Mon-archy had both conquered indigenous peoples and settled agreements implying mutual recognition with those who successfully resisted colonial invasion. Peoples within the hypothetical frontiers of former Colombia and latter Panama, such as the Kuna, had signed treaties.
17 Hence, when independence was about to occur, they might consider themselves on legal groundslegal for both parties -as distinct polities regarding the people who came from Europe and expanded through America or, in Kuna language, Abya Yala.
The first Constitution of Colombia or Nueva Granada referred to treaties with indigenous peoples but it did not recognize the force of the existing ones. Assumptions might somehow differ. According to constitutional phrasing, the treaties with Indians were to be framed on definitively unequal terms so as to submit them to civilisation and therefore to the State. Independence discontinued treaties. Pretending to be founding, they ignored existing agreements. On the contrary, without creating pretensions, from the indigenous viewpoint, non-indigenous constitutions could not recognize their rights as long as they did not treat them as distinct and equal, existing polities. Since the first contact in the 16th century up to the present, against all the odds, peoples such as the Kuna have maintained this stance in the face of Spanish, Colombian, and Panamanian colonial duress. Thus, they keep their own law and jurisdiction along with their side of the history -legal history too.
18
Indigenous narrative is an account you need in order to understand the constitutions, past or present, which resolutely ignore an entire and fundamental side of the history or even succeed in becoming blind and unaware nowadays. From the Embera-Wounaan and Kuna peoples we have learnt that the badly needed history is longer and broader than the strictly constitutional one. Concerning non-Euro-American people, constitutionalism did not discontinue colonialism. As for them, the former could even worsen the latter. Whatever the case may be, just to know and also to handle present law, we need to advance the historical research dealing with the colonial era into constitutional times.
19
Current one-sided history may be shocked now, but it has the very evidence to hand. Astonishment goes together with awareness given that the issue of indigenous presence is disregarded by usual constitutional history. Legal history in America takes into consideration cultures in the plural and even a clash of them, yet exclusively between Latin and Anglo parties as if indigenous peoples could not inherit, develop, and stand up for their own, plural cultures regarding history and law, narratives and polities.
20 As for constitutionalism, it did not begin in America with the Constitution of Nueva Granada, to be sure. It did not even start off in any place of the part we now call Latin America.
Nonetheless, the starting moment was not more brilliant at all. The founding fathers of the United States introduced indigenous peoples to constitutional time as literal foes.
21 There, in the final 1787 Constitution, the arithmetic for constituency was indeed consistent, counting free man as one; slave-owner as more than one; and Indian as naught.
22 As regards the latter, the nullifying phrasing would be reiterated when the Constitution was to be amended after abolition of slavery.
23 No constitutional amendment on behalf of indigenous people has ever taken place. Indian United States citizenship would come through statute without their consent as peoples.
24 All this is the tip of an iceberg of invasion, deprivation, harassment, confinement, subjugation, and even slaughter by legal and even con-stitutional means. Heed the qualifying adjectives.
25
The brother founders of Latin American States joined right away with constitutions assuming that conscience and other things in life might be a matter of human freedom for all citizens but indios, the indigenous people, so they were supposed to give up creeds and riches, together with their own polities, their law and jurisdiction, to actually share constituency and enjoy rights.
26 They were supposed to become human handing over occupancy of territories, ways of life, and control of themselves. Otherwise, what they and their domains were thought to need was guardianship from States, not entitlement of rights. Protection rather than freedom would be again the constitutional formula for indigenous peoples when States throughout America come to realize that they have not given up.
27
Throughout America, Latin and Anglo, very few States have no constitutional say, either past or present, regarding indigenous peoples. Chile is the most significant case. From the first to the current Constitution, from 1822 to 2001 (the year of the last amendment), there is no constitutional trace of indigenous existence through Chilean constitutionalism. Silence may be a way of saying. What does it mean in that case? In fact, since the 1822 Constitution, Chile had defined its frontiers including indigenous territories and even disregarding colonial boundaries previously recognized by the Spanish Monarchy.
28 Constitution discontinued treaties. Silence cancelled peoples. It might imply genocide more definitely than the terra nullius rule. Both meant the constitutional aim of outlawing and outrighting peoples as far as they retained their own cultural and territorial existence. First constitutions were talkative, seeming varied yet sharing intent. 
31
De tota America, Latina Anglicaque, fabula narratur? If so, we face a real hard case from the very beginning of the suitable proceedings. History rather than law has the capacity to play the part of the grand jury. And history seems to call constitutions themselves into question. Whatever the final outcome may be, we are in dire need of unbiased historical research and teaching not discontinuing the present. Present is history and so it must be treated even by lawyers. Otherwise, we will be unable to understand the meaning and reach of the law in force. Unless you like and choose pretension and delusion, fake and deceit, make-believe and right-depriving, the very divide between legal and historical spheres is absolutely unadvisable. It would simply be the first, deepest bias. ricana, 1985 . 1811 Constitution, 23: »Queda a la generosidad de las Provincias la cesión de aquellas tierras baldías que existen dentro de sus límites conocidos y habilitados de sus territorios, y que algún día, con la naturalización de extranjeros, o aumento de la población, pudieran producir un fondo considerable al Congreso; pero se reputarán indisputablemente de éste todas las que hoy se pueden considerar nullius por estar inhabitadas y fuera de los límites conocidos de las mismas Provincias, aunque comprendidas bajo la demarcación general del Reyno [de Nueva Granada] y de sus líneas divisorias con otras potencias y estados, o antiguos virreinatos, tales como las que bañan el alto Amazonas, Napo, Putumayo, Caquetá, Guaviare y otros ríos que descargan en el primero, o en el grande Orinoco, y en donde a su tiempo se establecerán nuevas poblaciones que hagan parte de esta Unión, a donde por lo menos conviene mantener lugares fronterizos que nos deslinden y dividan de las naciones vecinas que hoy ocupan la costa oriental de la América meridional.« 15 1853 Constitution, 47: »… Las secciones territoriales de la Goajira, el Caquetá y otras que no estén pobladas por habitantes reducidos a la vida civil, pueden ser organizadas y gobernadas por leyes especiales«; 1863 Constitution, 78: »Serán regidos por una ley especial los territorios poco poblados u ocupados por tribus de indíge-nas.« In fact, on more colonial terms, the territorial formula had early been somehow adopted by the 1812 Spanish Constitution (335.10: »Las diputaciones de las provincias de ultramar velarán sobre la economía, orden y progreso de las misiones para la conversión de los indios infieles …«), which was put into practice in Mexico, Central America and Peru, but directly not in Colombia, where Panama was then included. United States references, including some more involved and specific historiography, come later. 16 1811 Constitution, 24: »No por esto [terra nullius] se despojará ni se hará la menor vejación o agravio a las tribus errantes o naciones de indios bárbaros que se hallen situadas o establecidas dentro de dichos territorios; antes bien se las respetará como legítimos y antiguos propietarios, proporcionán-doles el beneficio de la civilización y religión por medio del comercio y por todas aquellas vías suaves que aconseja la razón y dicta la caridad cristiana, y que sólo son propias de un pueblo civilizado y culto; a menos que sus hostilidades nos obliguen a otra cosa«; 25: »Por la misma razón podremos entrar en tratados y negociaciones con ellos sobre estos objetos, protegiendo sus derechos con toda la humanidad y filosofía que demanda su actual imbecilidad, y la consideración de los males que ya les causó, sin culpa nuestra, una nación conquistadora«; 26: »Pero si dentro de los límites conocidos de las Provincias, o entre Provincia y Provincia, hubiera naciones de esta clase ya establecidas que hoy pudieran hacer cómodamente parte de esta Unión o de las mis-mas Provincias, principalmente cuando ya no las aterra un tributo ignominioso, ni un gobierno bár-baro y despótico, como el que ha oprimido a sus hermanos por trescientos años, se las convidará y se las atraerá por los medios más suaves, cuales son regularmente los del trato y comercio, a asociarse con nosotros, y sin que sea un obstáculo su religión, que algún día cederá tal vez el lugar a la verdadera, convencidos con las luces de la razón y del evangelio que hoy no pueden tener.« 17 Abelardo Levaggi, Diplomacia hispano-indígena en las fronteras de América. 
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